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Which Road to Social Revolution? 
 
Liberalization and Constitutional Reform in India 
 
 
ALEXANDER FIS CHER 
 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London1 
 
 
This article explores the constitutional ideology of the social revolution in the 
context of liberal economic reforms in India. While India’s new economic policies 
emphasize the benefits of competition and free markets her constitutional 
preferences remain embedded in legal provisions and traditions that favour social 
engineering in the name of economic, political and social equality. As 
liberalization as well as the global marketplace have become firmly established in 
the rhetoric and practice of elite politics, the political momentum towards 
economic change falls short of the numerical majorities to amend the Constitution. 
Consequently, India’s Supreme Court judges are taking centre-stage in the field of 
economic liberalization, having the power to either stall or accelerate the reform 
process by means of judicial review. Unrestrained by the political obstacles of 
democratic politics the court has sketched a dialectical reform of the constitutional 
political economy exercising judicial restraint as the means and modes of 
production are freed from state control and exposing judicial activism as the judges 
advocate the interweaving of the distribution and consumption of wealth with the 
goals of the social revolution. Based on an analysis of judicial policies as well as  
 
                                                 
1 The research for this article was made possible by a visiting fellowship of the Centre for 
the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and supported 
by funding from the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) and the German 
Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD). Please 
direct correspondence to Alexander Fischer, School of Law, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, 
United Kingdom; e-mail:  alexfischer@soas.ac.uk. 
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constitutional reform debates the article maintains that the constitutional ideology 
of the social revolution acts as an important, if not constructive, constraint and 
guideline as India’s policies are shifting from “empirical gradualist” socialism 
(Morris-Jones 1959: 415) to empirical gradualist liberalization and globalization. 
 The inauguration of the Indian Constitution on January 26, 1950 had marked 
the birth of an equal sovereign in the international system and has embodied the 
ideal of inculcating economic, political and social equality in the subcontinent: 
“The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The majority of 
its provisions are directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution” 
(Austin 1966: 50).2 Almost sixty years after the inauguration of the Constitution 
the meanings of independence, self-reliance and sovereignty have changed in the 
context of transnational flows of commodities and capital, people and discourses. 
Likewise, the pace of socio-economic change that was meant to bring inequalities 
to an end is perceived as chronically lagging behind the constitutional vision. India, 
therefore, seeks new roads to social revolution.  
 Technical blue prints to engineer the social revolution from above have been 
manifold. India’s Constituent Assembly had colossal developmental and even 
greater redistributive ambitions at the end of the 1940s. 
 
 
Nehru’s state was a purposive state. It was unashamedly socialist even 
though while moving the Objectives Resolution before the Constituent 
Assembly, he was aware that the word ‘socialist’ was missing. But, socialism 
was not just a stated objective, it was the very essence of the task that India 
had embarked herself upon. Nehru’s socialism manifested itself in the very 
structure of the Constitution. Socialism was not a dream of the masses; but 
the responsibility of the state (Dhavan 1992: 47). 
 
 
Thus, there was broad agreement that unless the problems of poverty and 
inequalities within the society were addressed and solved “all our article 
constitutions will become useless and purposeless.”3 As well as this, the 
Constituent Assembly’s socialist visions of a new political economy also reflected 
the experience of imperialism, which the key policy makers had come to view 
much more in terms of the imperatives of capitalist production than as an ideology 
of civilizational or racial domination. “It would therefore be foolish to conceive of 
Indian independence merely as a political condition [...]. Political independence 
would not remove India’s vulnerability to economic imperialism” (Khilnani 1998: 
71-2). In short, and on the most basic level, the Constituent Assembly chiselled 
“democratic socialism” (Dhavan 1992: 48) into the fundamental structures of the 
                                                 
2 All references are to the Constitution of India, 1950, as amended; the latest amendment, 
The Constitution (Ninety-Fourth Amendment) Act, 2006, came into force on the 12th of 
June 2006. Cases cited refer to decisions by the Supreme Court of India. 
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume II, 317, January 22, 1947 (3rd 
repr., Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
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“constitutional political economy” (Elster 1995) in order to give effect to the social 
revolution mandate and to respond to the apprehension of vulnerability of India’s 
economic interests in an open international economy. 
 
 
 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  R U L E S  A N D  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  
 
The constitutional political economy at Independence was attuned to the emerging 
model of economic development – and whenever there was a need for further fine-
tuning, or to override judicial pronouncements, an easy amendment procedure kept 
a sovereign Parliament in firm command as policy makers blended mixed economy 
and centralized planning. The state-directed regulatory schemes sheltered as well 
as controlled the private sector and India’s government-owned public sector 
unequivocally dominated key industries. Notwithstanding intervallic shifts in 
emphasis, the vital structures of these policy fundamentals were not subjected to 
significant changes until the early 1990s. Four decades of planning, however, have 
not delivered the promised social revolution. “Poverty in the country-side and the 
city continues to destroy the lives of hundreds of millions. And, as the example of 
the East Asian economies has dazzled the world, the dusty failures of the Indian 
state to devise anything like an effective policy of trade – fundamental to the raison 
d’état of any modern state – appear increasingly inexcusable. Gandhians and 
socialists, environmentalists and free-market liberals all agree that something has 
gone wrong” (Khilnani 1998: 62-3). It is difficult, though, to evaluate what has 
gone wrong and what or who is to blame. Economists inevitably differ in their 
judgments, each of them drawing on convoluted, often counterfactual, technical 
details, differing in their emphasis on domestic or international contexts. India’s 
project of development is further complicated by the country’s robust democratic 
politics in which ideological designs as well as practical economic policies often do 
not withstand the pressures and claims of voters. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, for 
instance, found himself with a strong parliamentary majority, yet, unable to sustain 
his efforts to “modernize” the Indian economy during the second half of the 1980s 
(Jenkins 1999). Nevertheless, he had put liberalization on the political agenda 
before increasing domestic deficits as well as a severe foreign-exchange crisis 
brought India’s economy to the brink of bankruptcy and collapse soon after the end 
of the Cold War. In response to this crisis the country embarked upon a reform 
process that gave fresh and strong emphasis to liberalization, deregulation and 
globalization. Today there is little doubt about India’s status as a potent emerging 
market and by the mid-1990s the Economist news article already had much-
admired the reforms as “nothing less than a repudiation of India’s distinctive 
approach to development – a repudiation, that is, of Nehru’s vision of socialist self-
reliance” (Corbridge and Harriss 2000: 157). At the same time, the Preamble of the 
Indian Constitution still venerates the Indian polity as a sovereign socialist secular 
democratic republic: 
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WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India 
into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and 
to secure to all its citizens: 
JUSTICE, social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; 
and to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the integrity of the 
Nation; 
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 
1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS 
CONSTITUTION.4 
 
 
Similarly, the Ninth Schedule, added by the Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 
1951, which provides a safe haven from judicial review for the land reform 
legislation by India’s States, irrespective of their inconsistency with fundamental 
rights, remains in effect and so do the constitutional amendments which have 
transformed the fundamental right to “acquire, hold and dispose property”5 into a 
much weaker, only statutory right to property.6 In 1983, five years after the 44th 
Amendment Act, 1978, Justice Chinnappa Reddy summed up the relationship 
between the social revolution and the right to property, holding that “[t]he 
fundamental right to property has been abolished because of its incompatibility 
with the goals of justice, social, economic and political and equality of status and 
of opportunity and with the establishment of a socialist democratic republic, as 
contemplated by the Constitution.”7 The judges have not changed their mind so far8 
and it is often forgotten that India is embracing the principles of a market economy 
without any formal constitutional guarantees of the right to property and without 
constitutional protection from its arbitrary expropriation. While the transformation 
of property regimes has been seen as a key constitutional challenge in postsocialist 
Eastern Europe (Stark and Bruszt 1998) as well as China (Oi and Walder 1999; Ho 
2005), India’s economic reforms have embraced market economics in the context 
of insecure and ill-defined property rights, thus, simply ignoring the most 
fundamental benchmark of liberal constitutionalism (Fitzpatrick 2006). Needless to 
                                                 
4 Preamble; words in italics were inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. 
5 Article 19(1)(f) in the “original,” unamended constitutional text. 
6 Article 300-A: “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”, 
inserted by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978; Article 300-A not only lacks the 
status of a fundamental right but also rules out constitutional judicial review with respect to 
questions of just and equitable compensation. 
7 State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale AIR 1983 SC 803 (par. 2). 
8 See, for instance, Dharam Dutt v. Union of India (2004) 1 SCC 712: “the right to property 
had ceased to be a fundamental right and the newly engrafted Article 300A of the 
Constitution requires only authority of law for depriving any person or his property (par. 
68). 
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say, the absence of formal constitutional guarantees of the right to property has 
neither stopped the flow of foreign direct investment nor the growth of the 
economy – in fact, the ease of the process of acquisition of land by the state often 
lays the ground for the speedy development of industrial areas and infrastructure. 
For instance, Bangalore’s world famous IT corridor and software technology parks 
could not have been built without the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development 
Act, 1966 which allows for the acquisition of agricultural lands without paying 
much compensation or concern for the needs and rights of the affected rural 
communities.9 It is not only a tragic irony that the abolition of property rights 
during the heyday of the socialist state and in the name of social justice has left 
many marginalised unprotected – subjected first to the needs of a self-serving and 
self-justifying socialist state and, today, also to the demands of private economic 
power. What is more, the question of property rights is a stark reminder of the 
complexity of the social revolution and the ideological nature of constitutional 
adjudication (Kennedy 1997). Some authors tend to equate constitutional law with 
repression or view the Supreme Court as a forum that tends to reinforce the 
prevailing hegemony (e.g. Bhushan 2004). Others see India’s constitutional system 
as inherently beneficent and continue to hold the Indian Supreme Court in high 
esteem: “on a comparative basis, it may be true to say that no apex court in any 
democratic country has shown as much dynamism, humanism, creativity, and 
empathy with the cause of the poor and the downtrodden as the Supreme Court of 
India has done” (Jain 2000: 99). The purpose of this study is not necessarily to 
choose between these competing visions, each of which seems to overlook 
important successes and failures of the judges’ efforts to implement the social 
revolution;10 much rather the specific aim of this article is to understand the 
“ontological robustness” of the social revolution, as the idea of the Indian 
Constitution continues to signify “a set of ideological sites that provide 
justification/mystification for constitutional theory and practice” (Baxi 2000b: 
1186). 
 While liberalization as well as the global marketplace are firmly established in 
the rhetoric of “elite politics” (Varshney 1999: 222) the constitutional text and its 
normative repercussions continue to reflect India’s “old-fashioned” development 
consensus. Not only is the constitutional ideology still formally engrained in the 
                                                 
9 Since 1966, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act has enabled the state to 
acquire nearly 57,000 acres of land all over Karnataka. A report on the impact of this Act 
and a summary of some ongoing cases in various courts of Bangalore has been published 
by the Alternative Law Forum in Bangalore; see Of Master Plans and Illegalities in an Era 
of Transition, available at: <www.altlawforum.org>. In general, without constitutional 
guarantees of the right to property, the courts seem unable to protect individual plaintiffs 
from unjustified expropriation or low compensation payments; see, for instance, Chameli 
Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549; New Reviera Coop. Housing Society v. Special 
Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 1 SCC 731; Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. Steel Authority of 
India (1995) Supp (2) SCC 225; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat 1995 (1) 
SCC 596. 
10 See Baxi’s (2000a) seminal article, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations 
in the Geographies of [In]justice. 
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days of state-directed economic development, but also the sweeping constitutional 
amendments, which allowed for Indira Gandhi’s assault on the private sector as 
well as the de-constitutionalization of the fundamental right to property under the 
Janata government, are left intact – despite significant liberal economic reforms for 
almost two decades. 
 
 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  I D E O L O G I E S ,  E L I T E  P O L I T I C S  
A N D  M I S S I N G  S U P E R M A J O R I T I E S  
 
In a nutshell, the widening gap between constitutional semantics and the new 
economic policies sponsors pungent debates about a constitutional crisis and the 
need for constitutional reforms (Baxi et al. 1999). Interestingly though, there seem 
to be no efforts to synchronize constitutional reforms to the new economic policies 
– on the contrary, face to face with markets and competition the constitutional 
reform debate aims at an extension of social, economic rights stressing the 
imperative nature of the social revolution. Constitutional ideologies, constitutional 
reform discourse, judicial decision making, and the amendment process are 
important in two ways. 
 To begin with, Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that “scarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a 
judicial question” (Tocqueville 1863: 375) holds true for India too, particularly at 
the end of the 1970s, as India’s Supreme Court judges began to reinvent 
themselves in the course of the emergence of public interest litigation as judicial 
activists of the “most active” sort. Today, authors like Rajeev Dhavan (1980: 1-26) 
or S.P. Sathe (2002: 249) simply as well as unequivocally refer to India’s Supreme 
Court as the “most powerful court in the world.” “The Court’s specific political 
role lies in its functioning as a parallel legislature and quite often as a parallel 
constituent body” (Baxi 1980: xii). Such extraordinary powers of course derive 
from a history of contestation. During the first clash of Parliament and the Supreme 
Court (on the interpretation of the constitutional provisions on the right to property) 
the dominant Congress Party could easily amend the Constitution, first, to undo the 
effects of judicial review, and then, trying to undo judicial review itself. With 
Nehru at its head, the Congress party was not content with gaining office and 
majorities, but aimed for nothing less than boundless legislative freedom to rebuild 
Indian society from above. Though not a chaste ‘Diceyan’ democracy, India’s 
electoral winners were thus quick to claim a popular mandate and knew no higher 
form of law than the will of Parliament as expressed in legislative texts or, if 
necessary, the wording of a constitutional amendment. In a nutshell, at the 
beginning of the 1950s, Nehru and India’s political elites had no doubt that “if the 
Constitution itself comes in our way, then surely it is time to change that 
Constitution” (Nehru 1951 [1989]: 325). 
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 Enter Chief Justice Sikri and the famous judicial opinions in Kesavananda 
Bharati vs. State of Kerala,11 known throughout the world as an epoch making 
affirmation of the power of judges, and asserting the ultimate supremacy of the 
Indian Supreme Court over the ballot box. This drumming vindication of judicial 
power, though partly a strategic retreat from the unsophisticated doctrines set out 
by the Golak Nath case,12 quickly became the icon of India’s new 
constitutionalism, as unelected judges have effectively substituted the notion of the 
separation of powers with an unambiguous declaration of formal judicial 
supremacy (Mehta 2007). With the downfall of the Congress system and the rise of 
regional parties and coalition governments India’s judges find themselves in a 
much more powerful position and have been making extensive use of it.13 The 
article illustrates that the political forces favouring basic changes in India’s 
economic policies have not been able to translate the momentum for economic 
reforms into a constitutional discourse, leave alone into the political consensus 
necessary for constitutional amendments. Consequently, as the supermajorities 
required for amending the Constitution’s political economy seem to be out of reach 
for coalition governments and their fragile political alliances, one cannot remain 
blind to the policy-making and policy-making potentials of the judges. Indian 
courts have not been shy to extend their power as public interest litigation 
revolutionized access to justice and led to an extraordinary extension of the social, 
political and economic rights as India’s Supreme Court judges pursue 
empowerment in the context of distributive justice – particularly economic and 
social rights. A powerful, activist judiciary, armed with a constitutional text that is 
thoroughly committed to the social revolution, may at times hang over economic 
reformers like a sword of Damocles. For instance, in 2003 the Supreme Court 
passed a devastating judgement for Disinvestment Minister Arun Shourie, as a 
public interest litigation challenged the decision of the Government to sell the 
majority of shares in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) and 
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL): 
 
 
There is no challenge before this Court as to the policy of disinvestment. The 
only question raised before us whether the method adopted by the 
Government in exercising its executive powers to disinvest HPCL and BPCL 
                                                 
11 (1973) 4 SCC 225. All references are to the Constitution of India, 1950, as amended; the  
latest amendment, the Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005, came into force 
on January 20, 2006. Cases cited refer to decisions by the Supreme Court of India. 
12 Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643. 
13 In this context, it is important to keep in mind that constitutional amendments and regular 
legislation to override constitutional decisions are not the only weapons of the legislative 
and the executive; for a general model see, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight (1998: 138 ff). The 
former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for instance, was able to exert direct pressure – if not 
threats – on individual judges; see, Granville Austin (Austin 1999: 317-8). Moreover, 
Parliament and the government not only can hold judicial salaries constant but also are in 
control of prospective appointments of justices to government posts after their retirement 
from the Indian Supreme Court (at the age of 65). 
    ALEXANDER FISCHER 
 
 
 
8 
without repealing or amending the law is permissible or not. We find that on 
the language of the Act such a course is not permissible at all. 21. In the 
result, we allow these petitions restraining the Central Government from 
proceeding with disinvestment resulting in HPCL and BPCL (SIC) to be 
Government companies without appropriately amending the statutes 
concerned suitably.14 
 
 
While the court does not question its earlier decisions, in which it had implicitly 
endorsed the new economic policy of disinvestment,15 the Supreme Court has 
also not ruled out the possibility of assessing the constitutionality of specific 
economic policies in the context of socialism being a basic feature of the 
Constitution. It is true that the disenchantment with India’s mixed economy and 
economic planning has seized the Supreme Court too and that the judges have 
often thrown their weight behind economic reforms – yet, judicial policy 
preferences may still come to haunt the liberalization process. In this respect, the 
main arguments advanced here concern the distinction drawn by Ashutosh 
Varshney (1999) between elite- and mass politics in the process of economic 
liberalization: “Elite concerns – investment tax breaks, stock market regulations, 
custom duties on imported cars – do not necessarily filter down to mass politics” 
(Varshney 1999: 223). They also do not impinge too much on the social revolution 
as not too many people are affected by them in a direct or obvious manner. On the 
other hand, if India’s economic reforms shift further towards the terrain of mass 
politics – privatization of the public sector, restructuration of labour laws, 
agricultural reforms and the reduction of fiscal deficits to low levels (Varshney 
1999: 225) – the judges will be bound to encounter much harder choices and 
greater problems reconciling between liberalization and the social revolution. Thus, 
the first central contestation of this article is that the Supreme Court, a key actor 
within the institutional matrix of economic reforms, will function as a powerful – 
yet often ignored – policy maker whenever liberal reforms conflict with the goals 
of the social revolution. In the words of Justice Banerjee: 
 
There cannot possibly be any doubt that the socialistic concept of the society 
as laid down in Part III and IV of the Constitution ought to be implemented 
in the true spirit of the Constitution. Decisions are there of this Court galore 
wherein this Court on more occasions than one stated that democratic 
socialism aims to end poverty, ignorance, disease and inequality of 
opportunity.16 
 
                                                 
14 Centre for Public Interest Litigation vs. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 3277. 
15 BALCO v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350. 
16 G.B. Pant University of Agriculture & Technology v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2000 
SC 2695 (par. 3); the case relates to a labour dispute, decided in favour of the regularisation 
of contract workers as full employees. 
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As a matter of fact this Court has been candid enough on more occasions than 
one and rather, frequently to note that socialism ought not to be treated as a 
mere concept or an ideal, but the same ought to be practised in every sphere 
of life and be treated by the law courts as a constitutional mandate since the 
law courts exists for the society and required to act as a guardian-angel of the 
society. As a matter of fact the socialistic concept of society is very well laid 
in Part III and Part IV of the Constitution and the Constitution being 
supreme, it is a bounden duty of the law courts to give shape and offer reality 
to such a concept. [...] The primary impact of socialism as a matter of fact is 
to offer and provide security of life so that the citizens of the country may 
have two square meals a day, and maintenance of a minimum standard of 
life, it is expected, would lead to the abridgment of the gap between the have-
s and have not-s. The feudal exploitation and draconian concept of law ought 
not to outweigh the basis structure of the Constitution, or its socialistic status. 
Ours is a socialist State as the Preamble depicts and the aim of socialism, 
therefore, ought to be to distribute the common richness and the wealth of the 
country in such a way so as to sub-serve the need and the requirement of the 
common man. [...] Raw societal realities, not fine-spun legal niceties, not 
competitive market economics but complex protective principles, shape the 
law when the weaker, working class sector needs succour for livelihood 
through labour.17 
 
The practical significance of these judgements should not be overestimated as the 
organized sector of India’s labour market, i.e. the government administration at the 
central, state and local level as well as public and registered private firms, employ 
only about 8.5 per cent of the country’s labour force of about 350 million people 
(Zagha 1999: 161). Yet, the decisions’ ideological contents, as spelled out by 
Justice Banerjee, are an indispensable cornerstone of India’s political economy, 
since the broad consensus on a socialist framework has been central and 
instrumental to the emergence of the state’s capacity to act as a third actor: “The 
state as a third actor began its autonomous career in independent India as a creature 
of Nehruvian socialism” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 62). The perseverance of the 
constitutional ideology of the social revolution, thus, is the second important 
concern of the arguments presented here, as the constitutional text continues to 
sanction a command polity model, imagining the state as “sovereign – 
differentiated, autonomous, and authoritative” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 14). 
 Expectations that liberal economic reforms might challenge the constitutional 
“socialist consensus” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 25-6; Jenkins 1999: 46) have so 
far remained unfulfilled and the social revolution laid out by the Constitution 
continues as market-oriented economic policies are introduced and consolidated. 
Consequently, the second central contestation of this article emphasizes the role of 
India’s constitutional ideology in channelling the structural changes of 
                                                 
17 Secretary, H.S.E.B. v. Suresh AIR 1999 SC 1160 (par. 1-3 and par. 7); this case too 
concerns regularisation of contract workers as full employees. 
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liberalization and globalisation. India escapes the discourse of statelessness (Evans 
1997) as the norms and values, the ideologies and principles enshrined in the 
Indian Constitution argue the case for a higher level of stateness in order to control 
and transform political effects of new economic policies as well as transnational 
production-consumption networks. For better or worse, the Indian Supreme Court 
judges to go along with the “untrammelled hegemony of Anglo-American 
ideological premises” (Evans 1997); in the context of India’s constitutional 
discourse the inexorable logic of economic globalization is not at all the decline of 
public institutions, but an increased role for the state. 
 
  
Today, the untrammeled hegemony of Anglo-American ideological premises 
is one of the most salient forces shaping the specific character of the current 
global economy, including the extent to which globalization is viewed as 
entailing the eclipse of the state. In this environment, pursuing Nettl’s agenda 
requires a different starting point. “Statelessness” can longer be treated as 
simply a feature of Anglo-American political culture. It must be dealt with as 
a dominant global ideology and potential institutional reality. Therefore, the 
question of whether the eclipse of the state is likely and, if so, what the 
consequences of such an institutional shift would be, takes precedence. The 
trick is to deal with the question of eclipse seriously without taking a positive 
answer for granted. I will argue that while eclipse is a possibility, it is not a 
likely one. What the “discourse of eclipse” has done is to make responses to a 
genuine crisis of state capacity unrelentingly negative and defensive. [...] 
Preoccupation with eclipse cripples consideration of positive possibilities for 
working to increase states’ capacity so that they can more effectively meet 
the new demands with which they are confronted. The goal should be to work 
back toward something closer to Nettl’s original agenda of comparing 
different kinds of “stateness” and their consequences, this time with more 
explicit attention to the effects of globalization (Evans 1997: 64). 
 
 
India’s unbeaten resistance to the unimaginative visions of statelessness underlines 
the institutional centrality of the state and the importance of diverging ideologies. 
Constitution, constitutional court, constitutional discourse as well as constitutional 
reform debates are crucial determinants of how India tries to find her 
autochthonous version of a liberal economy embedded within the social revolution. 
“[T]he Indian Constitution is a National Charter pregnant with social revolution, 
not a legal parchment barren of militant value to usher in a democratic, secular, 
socialist society which belongs equally to the masses including the harijan-girijan 
millions hungering for a humane deal after feudal-colonial history’s long night.“18 
As India’s liberalization has fundamentally altered her economic and development 
                                                 
18 Justice Krishna Iyer, Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of 
India AIR 1981 SC 298 (par. 11). 
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strategies, elements of state autonomy might have “leaked away, upwards, 
sidewards, and downwards” (Strange 1995), yet, they never just evaporated. Seeing 
with the eyes of India’s Supreme Court judges an eclipse of the state is not in sight 
as the constitutional commitments to the social revolution have not been given up 
and the new political economy of production is sustained only the promise of state-
administered social and economic justice only. 
 
 
A M E N D M E N T  P O L I T I C S ,  C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  C H A N G E  
A N D  T H E  S O C I A L  R E V O L U T I O N  
 
Independent India has witnessed a struggle for judicial supremacy and deep 
transformations of parliamentary governance. Naturally, since the inauguration of 
the Constitution, those who possessed or managed political authority objected to 
the transfer of their ‘political property rights’ to India’s apex courts. However, the 
first judicial rumblings against zamindari abolition and other land reform 
legislation in the 1950s unmistakably set the tone that would allow India’s judges 
to reinvent themselves in the style of judicial activism in the 1980s. Although the 
delegation of power to judiciaries, has often been accompanied by deep political 
hostility towards judges, it has also come to be viewed as a necessary evil; and 
even a polity that was inspired by the Westminster model of parliamentary 
sovereignty has succumbed to American-style judicial review, where ‘separation’ 
of powers means ‘checks and balances’ among co-equal branches of government. 
Such separation-of-powers games between India’s government legislators and 
judges are ritually rehearsed under the following headlines: parliamentary 
sovereignty; ultra vires doctrines; judicial review; concept of a basic structure of 
the constitution; separation of powers; Golak Nath, Keshavananda v. State of 
Kerala, Minerva Mills; 24th , 42nd, 43rd and 44th Constitution Amendment Acts; the 
story then continues with the emergence of public interest litigation, India’s rights 
revolution and an unparalleled transformation of judicial behaviour in terms of 
social activism. Today, there “is no area where the judgments of Supreme Court 
have not played a significant contribution in the governance – good governance – 
whether it be – environment, human rights, gender justice, education, minorities, 
police reforms, elections and limits on constituent powers of Parliament to amend 
the Constitution.”19 As well as this, the Indian Supreme Court has come to provide 
the single most important avenue for political activists, organized groups of every 
stripe and even opposition parties to challenge the government of the day. Above 
all, it is not only astonishing to note the exceptionally bold and copious rulings of 
the court after the emergency, but, what is more, since the end of the 1980s the 
                                                 
19 Speech of the Chief Justice of India, Y. K. Sabharwal, “Role of Judiciary 
in Good Governance” (2006: 11), at: <http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_links/ 
Good%20Governance.pdf>. 
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judges have repeatedly claimed the power of “the last word” and successfully 
imposed their will on the executive and legislative.20 
 The social revolution played an important part all the way through. Granville 
Austin’s concept of the “social revolution” has had an enormous impact on Indian 
constitutional law and his book (Austin 1966), which introduced this popular 
conception, has been “canonised by the bar and the bench [...], probably the most 
cited work in the Indian judicial decisions,” (Baxi 2001: 921), although, Austin 
himself (Austin 1966: 26) clearly credits the social revolution theme as the 
brainchild of two southern members of the Constituent Assembly, i.e. the 
newsarticle editor K. Santhanam and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (President of India 
1962-1967). What is more, the social revolution has become a centre-piece of the 
key decisions on the substantive limits of constitutional amendments in Indian 
constitutional history. The quarrels between Parliament and the Supreme Court 
were mostly triggered by land reform legislation (in the name of the social 
revolution) and judicial review of it.  
 
“It has been not today’s policy, but the old policy of the National Congress 
laid down years ago that the zamindari institution in India, that is the big 
estate system must be abolished. So far as we are concerned, we, who are 
connected with the Congress, shall give effect to that pledge naturally 
completely, one hundred per cent. And no legal subtlety and no change is 
going to come in our way. That is quite clear. […] Within limits no judge and 
no Supreme Court can make itself a third chamber. No Supreme Court and no 
judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of Parliament 
representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and there 
it can point it out, but in the ultimate analysis, where the future of the 
community is concerned, no judiciary can come in the way. And if it comes 
in the way, ultimately the whole Constitution is a creature of Parliament. But 
we must respect the judiciary, the Supreme Court and the other High Courts 
in the land. As wise people, their duty it is to see that in a moment of passion, 
in a moment of excitement, even the representatives of the people do not go 
wrong; they might. In the detached atmosphere of the courts, they should see 
to it that nothing is done that may be against the Constitution, that may be 
against the good of the country, that may be against the community in the 
larger sense of the term. Therefore, if such a thing occurs, they should draw 
attention to that fact, but it is obvious that no court, no system of judiciary 
can function in the nature of a third House, as a kind of Third House of 
                                                 
20 See, for instance, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India AIR 2003 SC 2363 
as a striking demonstration of judicial power, de facto overriding a legislative amendment, 
although, it is obvious that the judges have perfect and complete information about the 
preferences of the legislator. In other words, the Supreme Court of India is able to choose 
not to defer to the other branches of government. 
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correction. So, it is important that with this limitation the judiciary should 
function.”21 
 
Golak Nath, reversing precedents, was the first case that directly challenged 
Parliament, defending the property rights of an individual and arguing in favour of 
implied limitations on amending power. As the judges denied Parliament the right 
to abridge the fundamental rights as laid down by Part III of the Constitution, 
Parliament, with a strong Congress majority, simply set itself on collision course 
with the judges since the social revolution could not be achieved without essential 
modification of the right to property. Three judges delivered the minority opinion 
and followed the opinion of the legislators as the “social revolution in our country 
may require more rapid changes.”22 As the formal procedures for amending the 
Indian Constitution23 are simple, and at most require that an amendment bill is 
passed “in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House, and by 
a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and 
voting,” the massive mandate of the 1971 elections made it easy for the dominant 
Congress party to amend the Constitution in response to unpleasant judicial 
pronouncements and to keep ‘conservative’ judges away from the social 
revolution.24 Congress’s electoral success became the democratic mandate to pass 
and implement further constitutional amendments in accordance with a socialist 
electoral campaign. Eventually, the 24th and the 25th Amendment were passed, 
thus, allowing for large scale nationalizations in industry and commerce – and 
“saving” the social revolution from a conservative and capricious Supreme Court. 
In terms of theory, India’s colonial tradition of parliamentary sovereignty 
(Westminster style) clashed with a written constitution and judicial review 
(American style). In terms of practice, India’s judges did not prove sensitive 
enough to understand the rules of the game and it is worthwhile it is worthwhile 
remembering that the court’s frontal assault on parliament’s sovereignty was at 
first unsuccessful and politically costly. 
 Failing to adapt to the strong position of the legislator, the Kesavananda 
Bharati case did not shift judicial policies towards the social revolution as much as 
the legislators had hoped. Reassessing the role and relevance of the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, as laid out in Part IV of the Constitution, which “set 
forth the humanitarian socialist precepts that were the aims of the Indian social 
                                                 
21 Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, pp. 1195-96 [10th 
December 1949]. 
22 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 (par. 292). 
23 Article 368. 
24 Specific parts of the constitution can even be amended by simple majority. In addition to 
the special majority requirements outlined here, amendments that affect certain aspects of 
centre-state relations in India’s federal make-up, also require the ratification by at least half 
of the States’ legislatures. Again, the requirement of ratification by half of the States did 
not present a problem before the 1980s for most Congress governments could easily gather 
the necessary support in the States. After Golak Nath, the Supreme Court had continued to 
challenge Parliament by interfering with bank nationalization and the abolition of privy 
purses. 
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revolution,”25 the majority of the judges still declared that Golak Nath had been 
wrongly decided and upheld the 24th and 25th Amendment. Yet, the judges arrived 
at this decision in a very confusing and contradictory way, extending the power of 
judicial review via the invention of the basic structure doctrine, which proclaims 
certain basic features of the Constitution to be beyond Parliament’s power of 
amendment. Again, Indira Gandhi amended the Constitution to override this 
decision – this time however, she was not empowered by elections but empowered 
herself by declaring an internal emergency (1975-1977), which gave her the power 
to push the 42nd Amendment through a Parliament controlled via emergency rule. 
 At the end of the 1970s the following compromise emerged: After Indira 
Gandhi lost the 1977 elections, the Janata government would try to override the 
42nd Amendment, yet, needed the support of the Congress to pass constitutional 
amendment bills so that the 44th Amendment falls short of a complete repudiation 
of the 42nd Amendment. In the bargaining process surrounding the 44th 
Amendment, the left-leaning Janata government ensured an end to the disputes 
over the constitutional status of the right to property by removing it from the 
fundamental rights section of the Indian Constitution once and for all.26 At the 
same time, the basic structure doctrine has been accepted by the legislators, so that 
the judges have safeguarded their right to control the constitutional amendment 
process. The Supreme Court, now more to separation-of-power games, has 
accepted the end result without reservations; judicial activism would return to the 
Indian polity in the 1980s, yet, with a shift in emphasis from property- to civil 
rights. In Minerva Mills, the nationalisation of a textile undertaking called Minerva 
Mills, under the provisions of the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 
1974 was challenged and the court was asked to declare the unconstitutionality of 
Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. Once again, the 
social revolution theme was invoked by the judges: 
 
 
The history of India’s struggle for independence and the debates of the 
constituent Assembly show how deeply our people value their personal 
liberties and how those liberties are regarded as an indispensable and integral 
part of our Constitution. It is significant that though Part III and IV part of 
our Constitution as two distinct fasciculus of Articles, the leaders of our 
independence movement drew no distinction between the two kinds of State's 
obligations – negative and positive.27 [...] The significance of the perception 
that Parts III and IV together constitute the core of commitment to social 
revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution is to be 
traced to a deep understanding of the scheme of the Indian Constitution. 
Granville Austin's observation brings out the true position that Parts III and 
IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You 
snap one and the other will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for 
                                                 
25 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 (par. 489). 
26 See above, p. 4. 
27 Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 (par. 53). 
    ALEXANDER FISCHER 
 
 
 
15 
achieving the social revolution, which is the deal which the visionary 
founders of the Constitution set before themselves. In other words, the Indian 
Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and 
IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony 
of the Constitution.28 [...] This is not mere semantics. The edifice of our 
Constitution is built upon the concepts crystallised in the preamble. We 
resolved to constitute ourselves into Socialist State which carried with it the 
obligation to secure to our people justice – social, economic and political We, 
therefore, put Part IV into our Constitution containing directive principles of 
State policy which specify the socialistic goal to be achieved. [...] Parts III 
and IV together constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form 
its conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will 
ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic structure of our 
Constitution.29 
 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to reaffirm the basic 
structure doctrine and confirmed the unconstitutionality of the specific parts of the 
42nd Amendment. The informal constitutional consensus which has emerged since 
the 1980s is based on (1) the acceptance of the basic structure doctrine by all 
political institutions (2) the Supreme Court is exercising maximum restrain when 
an amendment is challenged as unconstitutional (3) judicial activism in the name of 
the social revolution has shifted away from interference with economic policies to 
the field of civil, social and economic rights. The balance between fundamental 
rights and the directive principles of State policy, i.e. the social revolution, is thus 
moving towards a state of “stable equilibrium” as hung parliaments and weak 
coalitions provide the judges with a window of opportunity to change the balance 
of power in their favour (Sathe 2002: 96 ff; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). Once 
more, the social revolution provided a welcome and sturdy ideological backbone, 
this time in the context of judicial activism. For instance, the social revolution 
mandate is an essential element of one of the most important public interest 
litigation decisions, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, with Justice Bhagwati’s long and 
famous exposition on the question of locus standi and liberalization of standing, 
setting the tone of judicial activism in India. 
 
It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that 
our Constitutional is not a non-aligned national charter. It is a document of 
social revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including 
the judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch of the State, to transform 
the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic 
and political will inform all institutions of national life and there will be 
equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio-
                                                 
28 Ibid., (par. 56). 
29 Ibid., (par. 57). 
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economic destination and a creative function. It has to use the words of 
Granville Austin, to become an arm of the socio-economic revolution and 
perform an active role calculated to bring social justice within the reach of 
the common man. It cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it 
must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic justice. The 
British concept of justicing, which to quote Justice Krishna Iyer (Mainstream, 
November 22, 1980), “is still hugged by the heirs of our colonial legal culture 
and shared by many on the Bench” is that “the business of a Judge is to hold 
his tongue until the last possible moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid 
to look.”30 
 
These ideological fundaments of the Consitutional ideology have remained 
untouched as liberalization has changed India’s political economy. Public Interest 
Litigation revolutionized access to justice in India and the democratization of the 
judicial process has led to an extraordinary extension of the social, political and 
economic rights. In other words, as economic planning and the socialist modes of 
production are abandoned and reformed in line with competitive market policies, 
India’s Supreme Court judges pursue the social revolution in the context of 
distributive justice. Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that India’s rights 
revolution remains first and foremost embedded within the context of radical 
redistributive goals and that judicial declarations of individual rights (Epp 1998) 
are of secondary importance. “Indeed civil liberties concerns have been palpably 
weak in Indian courts” (Mehta 2005:165). The nexus between social revolution, 
stice and legal rights is thus fundamental to the Indian rights revolution as the 
representations of socio-economic entitlements remains at the centre of political 
imagination. And while it is clear that the pace of law and social change is still 
chronically lagging behind constitutional visions, Indians have skilfully utilized 
socio-economic rights discourses to contribute to meaningful social change. To 
assess the potential of this “rights revolution” (Epp 1998; Ignatieff 2000), it is 
necessary to trace an evolving constitutional jurisprudence that has asserted greater 
powers of judicial review and to chart its influence on contemporary legal and 
political practices. It is clear that the intellectual origins of the Indian rights 
revolution have had a contentious history, leading back to the formal articulation of 
various demands for rights during the independence movement since 1895 as well 
as the language of rights of the Karachi Resolution of 1931 (Reddy and Dhavan 
1994). The concern of this article, however, is less with the history than with the 
discernable patterns of juristic thought: Through the modern process of 
constitutionalization, the social revolution has integrated itself into the fabric of 
positive law, engendering radical shifts in our understanding of the character of 
Indian law as the sphere of socio-economic rights transforms into fundamental 
norms that infiltrate and shape the architectonic principles of the new economic 
order (Alexy 2002; Habermas 1996: 247-248). 
 
                                                 
30 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149 (par. 27). 
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R E F O R M I N G  T H E  C O N S T I T U T I O N :  
T O W A R D S  L I B E R A L I Z A T I O N ?   
 
The political economy of “socialism” has triggered important constitutional 
amendments to achieve the desired goals of the social revolution: The 1st 
Amendment created the 9th schedule, the 7th Amendment introduced new land laws, 
expropriatons following the 17th Amendment were struck down by the Golak Nath 
decision, correspondingly the 24th, 25th and 27th amendment diluted Golak Nath 
while the 42nd amendment overrode Kesavananda. Liberalization policies, so far, 
have neither translated into mass politics nor into a constitutional reform debate. 
On the contrary, the constitutional reforms envisaged by policy-makers give 
preference to the social revolution ideology and a high level of stateness. 
 The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution 
(NCRWC) submitted its Final Report in spring 2002. The fierce opposition to the 
Commission and the political posturing at the time of its appointment undermined 
the entire exercise of reviewing India’s constitutional experience after 50 years. 
Nevertheless, the Final Report, as it has been submitted to the Government of 
India, spells out central policy preferences in the field of constitutional reform. As 
well as this, the suggestions of the NCRWC are surprisingly similar to the general 
debates in India’s law and policy journals. As a result the final report mirrors many 
of the dominant ideological currents of the constitutional reform debates. The 
absence of any suggestions to constitutionalize certain aspects of economic reforms 
or to re-introduce a fundamental right to property supports the contestations 
advanced in this article. Even the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, key 
initiator and staunch defender of the Review Commission, did not talk about the 
need for inserting liberal economic policies in the constitutional text but much 
rather warned of “an open-door policy” and affirmed the relevance of protecting 
small and cottage industries to increase employment as well as greater state 
investments in the agricultural sector (Raina 1998: 35). Vajpayee also gave the 
Commission a specific task: “The country is also faced with a pressing challenge to 
quickly remove regional and social imbalances by reorienting the development 
process to benefit the poorest and the weakest” (Vajpayee 2000: 98). Can it be that 
India is trying to induce a liberal market economy within the paradigms of a 
socialist constitution? 
 It is interesting to note that even though the country has been carrying out 
policies, which are aimed at providing more liberal markets and have included 
reforms in license policies as well as in investment and privatisation, the NCRWC 
seems to justify these scenarios by the same instruments, which were said to be the 
headlights of socialist ideology in India. The constitution with its goal of the social 
revolution uses the same terminology today as it did then to justify socialism. The 
report of the committee to review the working of this constitution not only provides 
further justification for the existence of these terms and ideologies but also seeks to 
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ensure that they are strengthened and more rigorously integrated with state policy. 
Therefore, the question to be asked is: 
 
The political economy of the Constitution is thus largely a product of the 
theory and thought of the age of market failure which was based on ‘the 
proposition that the market is unable to satisfy certain types of demand.’ Now 
India has entered the age of state failure and as a result wants to return to the 
market. So a question arises whether a political economy geared to market 
failure can now service the market. A more specific issue is whether this 
political economy, envisaging poverty eradication within the framework of 
socialism is functional to poverty eradication within the framework of market 
economy (Ghouse 1999: 240). 
 
If we address ourselves to this question within the parameters of the NCRWC then 
the question would be is the panacea for today a form of market economy within 
the framework of the social revolution? Even though the market economy is lauded 
as the most desirable, the necessity for removal of inequality of income, wealth and 
means of production and the redistribution of resources of the community are still 
considered indisputably essential for securing social and economic justice and 
welfare of the people (Ghouse 1999). 
 The answers to the questions above seem to be that despite the use of jargon 
and rhetoric the reviewers of the Constitution have firmly established that it is still 
a document for social change, which has to be brought about in concordance with 
economic reform. To do this they take recourse not only to history but also current 
trends in growth, seeking to use the instrumentality of the state in a more “state of 
the art” manner. The measures suggested by the reviewers seek to establish liberal 
economic policies as merely another tool for creating state capacity, which will 
help eradicate some of the problems that had not been effectively addressed by the 
system of licensing and government-owned public sectors.  
 There is also no doubt that welfare rights should be enhanced: “A new article, 
say article 21-C, may be added to make it obligatory on the State to bring suitable 
legislation for ensuring the right to rural wage employment for a minimum of 
eighty days in a year.31 The role of the judiciary in the integration of directive 
principles of state policy and the fundamental rights has been commended by the 
NCRWC, which calls this process “constitutionalising” social and economic rights. 
Yet, in the eyes of the Commission this process has not been adequate to fulfil the 
goals of the founding fathers. The Commission reinforces the need to strive for 
both common good and against common detriment. Firm in its belief that this is to 
be brought about by taking recourse to the directive principles of state policy as the 
NCRWC spells out its understanding of the lessons learnt in fifty years: “Macro 
economic stability is an essential pre requisite for achieving growth needed for 
development. In largely agrarian societies like India, economic growth should 
                                                 
31 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. I, 
91, par. 3.13.2. (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
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ensure employment generation. Growth does not trickle down; development should 
address human needs directly.”32 
 These points have been repeatedly stressed in the report showing the absolutely 
inescapable nature of social economic and rights oriented concerns of the 
Commission and the view that only a high level of stateness can achieve such ends. 
In this context the right to food, livelihood and work being justiciable is a higher 
priority than mere economic growth as measured by the rise in national income. In 
search of the right parameters of development and having eschewed models from 
developed nations the commission tries to carve out India’s place through an 
inventive argument which states that these justiciable rights cannot be spoken of 
without providing and ensuring employment – which goal thus becomes the ground 
for both social and economic policies. 
 Furthermore, the State is enjoined to ensure market stability and lack of 
fluctuation in the agricultural sector, which seems idealistic given that competition 
in a market economy is in itself a high accomplishment without the added 
requirement to rise above as a regulatory authority. An idealistic scenario of a 
network creation scenario between demand, production, market, availability and 
economic prices is also envisaged.33 It also suggests for taking measures to protect 
Indian peasantry and “other traditionally producing classes from the adverse effects 
of the regimes of WTO, IPR, etc. while at the same time helping them to secure the 
benefits of those regimes.”34 In addition, high stateness is needed as “the 
government has the further duty to provide information for the marketing of 
agricultural goods especially due to freer import regulations under the WTO.”35 
 The unorganised sector and its development tie in with the reports tilt towards 
social development. It again makes it a duty of the state to provide laws for the 
regulation of employment of the unorganised sector, which constitutes the majority 
work force of the country (see above, p. 8). 
 The report stresses that high growth rate as a result of service sector growth 
result is delivering higher employment and thus not to be equated with 
development, and thus, it should not be confused with the one area, which will 
actually bring development which is the creation of jobs in the agrarian sector. This 
is explicitly stated when the report says that industrialization and heavy industries 
offer limited solutions to India’s developmental problems.36 
 Ensuring that the social message does not get sidetracked the commissions 
report underlines the fact that “only a massive transfer of resources to the 
educational programmes for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes will enable 
                                                 
32 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. II, 
85 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
33 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. I, 
336 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
34 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. II, 
84 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
35 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. I, 
356 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
36 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. II, 
337-8 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
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us to achieve the kind of quantitative expansion need to bring these communities 
on par with others in terms of skills and knowledge base to engage with the modern 
world.”37 In this respect, the Commission took into account: “the changing 
parameters of State action in the context of the tectonic shift toward globalisation 
and liberalisation. It is necessary for the Government to step in firmly and clearly, 
if the gap is to be bridged between private prejudices, camouflaged in the name 
“efficiency” on the one hand and the just aspirations of the SC, ST, BC including 
OBC minorities, and women.38 
 Clearly then, the argument that the NCRWC ties economic development firmly 
with social development is garnered not only by the fact that their second working 
article is titled towards socio economic development but also by the fact that the 
very question on economic progress is not a question of economic growth, but 
stated as being: “what has been the pace of social and economic growth in India? 
Has it been fair, fast and equitable?”39 “What merits a new dimension to the 
process of social economic change within India is the global competition of market 
shares. It will become increasingly difficult for Governments in developing 
countries to protect job, wages and working conditions.”40 Here, the NCRWC 
reflects on the fact that developed countries have extremely high disparities in 
income consumption amongst their various segments. The Commission stated that 
the share of income consumption amongst the poorest 20% in India is 9.2% while 
that of the richest is 39.5%. In USA poorest 20% had 1.5% and the richest had 
45.2%. The index was used as evidence that widespread social disparities are 
linked to one dimensional economic growth. Though not rejecting outright the 
model of the developed nations the Commission tries to tread the middle path by 
putting this factor forward as a negative impact India has to avoid. It suggests that a 
true test of development would be social progress as opposed to merely a rise in the 
national income, a test the Commission considers of no value. 
 The argument of socio-economic development is also prioritised using the case 
study of Karnataka, an Indian state and South Korea.41 Both Karnataka and South 
Korea have a similar size of population, yet, per capita income in South Korea is 
20 times that of Karnataka. The reasons cited by the NCRWC for Korea’s progress 
are universal literacy and good health. e.g. life expectancy in at birth amongst 
women in Korea is 11 years higher than in Karnataka and the infant mortality rate 
10 times lower. Female literacy rate is 95% whereas in Karnataka it is 44%. Thus 
the importance and perspective of social development as instrumental for economic 
change is abundantly highlighted by the Final Report. 
 The role of high stateness in this picture is important to point out, as in all these 
scenarios state control, or regulation or sensitisation are key concepts stressing the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., at 299. 
38 Ibid., at 305. 
39 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol II., 
65 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
40 Ibid., at 147. 
41 Ibid., at 129. 
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need for further legislation and state action to deal with and solve the socio 
economic crisis. 
 Not only does the Commission actively suggest increasing the ambit of the 
State but it also recommends public good duties to be enjoined on private 
organisations thus enforcing a more strident socialism in the voice of the 
Constitution. Under the heading Social obligations of the private sector the report 
states that since “investment in the private sector is largely from and by public 
bodies (Government bodies and Banks which handled Public Finds) the private 
sector too has social responsibilities to perform.”42 The NCRWC’s 
recommendation that under Article 51 A of the Constitution it should be the duty of 
industrial organisations to provide education to the children of their employees is 
one case in point. Even more interesting is the Commission’s recommendation with 
respect to disinvestments: 
 
The Commission recommends that it should be mandatorily stipulated in the 
Memoranda of Understanding of privatisation or dis-investment of public 
sector undertakings that the policy of reservation in favour of SCs, STs and 
BCs shall be continued even after privatisation or dis-investment in the same 
form as it exists in the Government and this should be incorporated in the 
respective statutes of reservation. As a measure of social integration there 
should be a half percent reservation for children of parents one of whom is 
SC/ST and the other parent in non- SC/ST and this reservation should be 
termed as reservation for the Casteless.43 
 
Clearly, concepts which have till now been confined to the realm to government 
and public institutions are seeping into the private market vocabulary. 
 Last but not least, the Commission’s desire to create awareness of the 
fundamental duties seems to point towards a vocalisation of principles, which 
emphasise a two way relationship between the state and its citizens, further 
reinforcing the notion of an almost invisible broadening of the peripheries of the 
state. From the explicit legitimisation of an increase in the duties of the state, an 
articulation of the duties and responsibilities of private institutions, individual 
duties and thus civil societies duties are also articulated and given weight in the 
new model: “The Commission recommends that the duty to vote at elections, 
actively participate in the democratic process of governance and to pay taxes 
should be included under the ambit of Article 51 A.”44 Eclipse of the Indian state? 
 
 
 
T H E  S U P R E M E  C O U R T  A N D  E C O N O M I C  R E F O R M S :  
F R O M  M A R X  T O  R A W L S ?  
                                                 
42 Ibid., at 82. 
43 Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, vol. I, 
296 (Lok Sabha Secretariat 1999). 
44 Ibid., 117. 
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As a result of the 42nd Amendment, which introduced the word socialism in the 
Preamble of the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
laws of nationalization of private property, introduced a fundamental right to ‘equal 
pay for equal work,’ struck down the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 
as they failed to achieve the establishment of a welfare society, regularised casual 
workers with parity in pay with regular workers and seeks to reduce inequalities in 
income.45 As well as this, the Supreme Court has exercised judicial restraint as 
Parliament has passed dozens of fresh amendment acts and more than trippled the 
number of acts placed under the Ninth Schedule. 
 This policy of judicial restraint (after the 44th Amendment) in the field of 
economic policies has been applied as industries were nationalized and private 
companies were excluded from areas occupied by the State sector. As new 
economic policies were introduced in the 1990s the court stuck to its new found 
preference for judicial restraint in economic affairs. However, the court enforces 
guidelines to implement liberalization policies: E.g. the policy of disinvestment is 
approved of by the court, yet, disinvestment agreements can be struck down as they 
had not been sanctioned by Parliament.46 A more direct effect of liberalization can 
be found in the judges approval of greater competition in the transport sector.47 
 
Decolonisation of our jurisprudence, heavily soaked in Ango-American legal 
literature, is a desideratum if the wretched millions of the Indian earth are to 
enjoy distributive justice and share in the work, wealth and happiness of 
Bharat. Regrettable but true, the socalist structure of our constitutional order 
– a basic feature, as ruled by the Suprerne Court in the past – is being 
subverted by a coup engineered by Fund-Bank pressure and M.N.C. 
infiltration into Indian economic space, making swadeshi (Gandhi), self-
reliance (Nehru) amd democratic economic sovereignty (Constitution) mere 
abracadabra. The judicature, with power to strike down contra-constitutional 
manouvres, has specifically held in Nakara Case plus that socialist factors 
are basic features and inviolable, We thus face a juris-crisis and the Court 
must act. Which way? It is anybody’s guess. Will it be the Waterloo of the 
Preamble, Parts III, IV and IVA, as interpreted by the Apex Court? (Iyer 
1997: 172) 
 
One the other hand, it may be difficult to uphold judicial restraint as liberalization 
shifts towards mass politics and the court has to decide in matters relating to labour 
laws or subsidies. An interesting case to assess the direction of judicial preferences 
is Dalmia Cement v. Union of India48 which upheld the Jute Packaging Material 
                                                 
45 See, Excel Wear v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 25; Randhir Singh v. Union of India 
AIR 1982 SC 879; Nakara D.S. v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130; Dharwad Employees 
v. State of Karnataka AIR 1990 SC 883; Samatha v. State of A.P. 1997 SC 3297. 
46 Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India AIR 2003 SC 3277. 
47 Jagdip Singh v. Jagir Chand AIR 2001 SC 3027. 
48 (1996) 10 SCC 104. 
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(Compulsory Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987, although, the judges 
themselves had to admit that the requirement by law to use jute bags for packaging 
cement had extremely negative effects on the industries concerned. However, the 
judges put the welfare of agriculture first: 
 
 
Article 38 of the Constitution enjoins the State to strive to promote the 
welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, the 
social order in which justice - social, economic and political - shall, inform 
all the institutions of the national life striving to minimise inequalities in 
income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities, 
opportunities amongst individuals and groups of people residing in different 
areas or engaged in different avocations. As stated earlier, agriculture is the 
mainstay of rural economy and empowerment of the agriculturists. 
Agriculture, therefore, is an industry. To the tiller of the soil, livelihood 
depends on the production and return of the agricultural produce and 
sustained agro-economic growth. The climatic conditions throughout Bharat 
are not uniform. They vary from tropical to moderate conditions. Tillers of 
the soil being in unorganised sector, their voice is scarcely heard and was not 
even remotely voiced in these cases. Their fundamental right to cultivation is 
as a part of right to livelihood. It is a bastion of economic and social justice 
envisaged in the Preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution. As stated 
earlier, the rights, liberties and privileges assured to every citizen are linked 
with corresponding concepts of duty, public order and morality. Therefore, 
the jural postulates form the foundation for the functioning of a just society. 
The fundamental rights ensured in Part III are, therefore, made subject to 
restrictions i.e., public purpose in Part IV Directives, public interest or public 
order in the interest of the general public. In enlivening the fundamental 
rights and the public purpose in the Directives, Parliament is the best Judge to 
decide what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into 
existence and the majority political party assumes governance of the country. 
The Directive Principles are the fundamentals in their manifestos. Any 
digression is unconstitutional. The Constitution enjoins upon the Executive, 
Legislature and the Judiciary to balance the competing and conflicting claims 
involved in a dispute so as to harmonise the competing claims to establish an 
egalitarian social order. It is a settled law that the Fundamental Rights and the 
Directive Principles are the two wheels of the chariot; none of the two is less 
important than the other. Snap one, the other will lose its efficacy. Together, 
they constitute the conscience of the Constitution to bring about social 
revolution under rule of law.49 
 
From this perspective, let us consider the constitutionality of the provisions 
of the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble of the 
                                                 
49 Ibid., par. 21. 
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Act, would, in unmistakable terms, indicate that it intends to provide 
livelihood to nearly 4 million rural agricultural families and 2.5 lakh 
industrial workers. The ancient agro-based jute industry occupied a 
significant position in our national economy, in particular in the economy of 
the North-Eastern region of the country. It is an agro-based and labour-
intensive industry. It is also an export-oriented one and its raw material is 
based entirely on indigenous jute produced by the above agricultural families. 
Parliament avowedly intended to protect the interests of the persons involved 
in jute production; jute industry, therefore, requires protection.50 
 
 
The Supreme Court seems to follow a twofold strategy: The social revolution is 
defended as the judges identify new groups as beneficiaries of state actions and 
create new patterns of distribution as well as rights that can be claimed against the 
state. For instance, the Supreme Court pushes for legislation that enshrines the right 
to work: “[T]he right to free choice of employment, the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work, the right to protection against unemployment etc., and the right 
to security of work [...] true that all these rights cannot be extended simultaneously. 
But they do indicate the socialist goal. The degree of achievement in this direction 
depends upon the economic resources.”51 Similar developments can be observed 
with respect to the right to food, which the judges deduce in the context of the right 
to life, Article 21.  
 The judges seem to be content to apply a wider definition of socialism, that is 
at ease with the market economy as long as the state is capable to control the 
material resources produced and as long as wealth is distributed as to best serve the 
social revolution. The article’s analysis of the impact of globalization and 
liberalization on India’s constitutional fabric focusing on the amendment process 
and the final report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution illustrates the ordering and re-ordering of constitutional priorities as 
India transforms her economy. To sum up, and to return to Evans’ arguments, the 
evidence that we can extract from the Report of the Commission to Review the 
Working of the constitution clearly points towards a vision of a high level of 
stateness, even after liberalization. The constitutional framework of today does not 
really provide for an ideological shift from fifty years ago. The State is viewed as 
responsible for the same functions – yet, it is accepted that the Indian state needs a 
new set of economic tools to fulfil its tasks. What is at stake is the question of state 
autonomy, the maintenance of “command politics.” India then is a good example 
for the relevance of autochthonous ideological channelling of economic reforms as 
an explanatory factor (Mitra 1990). The Supreme Court judges recognize that 
liberalization increases both – the potential returns from effectual state action and 
the costs of state ineffectiveness. India’s Constitution and the constitutional 
discourse do not see globalization as a movement towards statelessness. Given the 
                                                 
50 Ibid., par. 23. 
51 Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 (par. 241). 
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degree to which political effects of economic change are mediated by 
superimposed interpretative frames, the constitution and its ideology becomes 
consequential, not just for the insights it offers but also because of its potential 
impact on economic policy. 
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